(2) Courts do not explain or justify the case selection, they are just cherry-picking. The usual trick is choosing only those countries that apply the same solutions as we prefer.
(3) Arguments from comparative law are rather used in human rights cases than in institutional ones. This is due to the internationalised (or even universal) human rights discourse which is less bound to the national traditions.
(4) Citations are more likely to occur in new and complex cases, or in cases which have a potentially important social or political impact. The explicit reference to foreign case law might be especially relevant for new constitutional courts of transitional countries which try to show themselves in a prestigious society of well-established foreign constitutional or supreme courts in order to collect more credibility in their respective domestic discourses.
(5) The number of citations is directly related to the level of disagreement (the more dissenting opinions we have, the more likely it is to have an argument from comparative law). They are used in order to give the impression that a decision was arrived at after careful consideration.
(6) The South African Supreme Court, the US Supreme Court, the ECtHR (and the German Federal Constitutional Court, even though it is not mentioned in the fi nal conclusions, but it comes up in many country reports) are the most infl uential "foreign" constitutional courts in the world.
Usually we read in books that were written on arguments from comparative law that such arguments are becoming more and more frequent in courts all around the world (this is often supposed to legitimise why someone writes a book on the issue). The main causes of the trend are said to be: The general trend of globalization, and, as a consequence, the overall weakening of national isolation; the emergence of inter-or supranational courts as meeting points of different legal cultures, where the practice of legal comparison spreads the culture of comparative law; and the similar role-perception of judges (i.e. that of guarding the basic values of constitutionalism which are considered as being some kind of modern or postmodern natural law or as a modern ius gentium) 3 in liberal democracies. This common identity then serves as the ground for a feeling of global community, which in turn leads to a dialogue, 4 which manifests itself in references made in decisions to each other's works. 5 Groppi and Ponthereau deny the existence of this trend (p. 430), and most of the country reports do support this brave (but somewhat sad) thesis with data. Their explanation is that international courts (ECtHR and IACHR) take over this role (in the terminology of the volume, international courts are not "foreign", if there is an international obligation to follow their decisions).
Whet her one goes for arguments from foreign law or not, often also depends on whether one has suffi cient time and knowledge of the relevant languages. The editors' "suspicion is that this practice of citation more than contributing to the enhancement of 'legal cosmopolitanism', actually promotes the creation of a 'closed circle', from which most of the non-English speaking countries are left outside in the cold" (p. 429). This linguistic barrier might be the reason why the ECtHR is world-wide much more cited than the German Federal Constitutional Court, even though the latter one does have a doctrine of fundamental rights which is at certain parts more sophisticated than the one of the ECtHR. To a good part for linguistic reasons, the ECtHR seems to have the role of disseminating European constitutional culture all around the world.
The volume of Groppi and Ponthoreau is a methodologically well-designed project where all relevant questions have been asked and empirically tested (sometimes also such questions were asked which seem to be less relevant, like whether citations are in footnotes or in the main text of a judgment, or whether the citation is in the majority or in the dissenting opinion instead of just asking whether there were any dissenting opinions in the judgment). The individual chapters are also well-written, thorough and with the help of the graphs also easily understandable. This piece hopefully shows an empirical turn in legal scholarship: we much too often talked about trends without actually checking them empirically.
6 Groppi and Ponthereau are convincingly showing that legal scholarship can and should develop in its methods, methods informed by social sciences are not simply for legal sociologists, but such data can also inform hard core doctrinal debates.
